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1 Introduction
Research and Development (R&D) activity is considered important from the viewpoint of
both society and individual firms in oligopolistic industries. From the perspective of firms,
R&D is considered valuable, primarily because of the reason that R&D results either in
lower costs of production or development of new products. For both these cases, the
firm enjoys an edge over its rivals, by being able to produce at a lower cost or enhance
its market. Due to lowering of production cost, and consequently lower selling price,
even the consumers benefit, which is refelcted in the form of higher consumer surplus.
Consumers also tend to gain from increased product differentiation when R&D results in
innovating new and related products. Also, R&D activities push out the technological
frontier and thus take the economy to a higher technological plane. R&D may even
lead to generation of environment-friendly technologies (e.g. developing less polluting
production techniques or reusing wastes from industries or households). For all these
reasons, quite often governments also provide incentives for investing in R&D.
However, at the firm level, the intensity of R&D activity depends on various factors
including the availability of funds for conducting R&D, possibility of spillovers of R&D
outcomes and the probability of success in R&D. In addition, the level of information
that a firm possesses about its rivals in an oligopolistic industry may act as a decisive
factor. Whether a firm has perfect or imperfect information, or complete or incomplete
information about its rivals’ various features (like marginal cost of production, R&D
status, prospective spillover benefits etc.), may affect a firm’s decision to invest in R&D.
Role of incomplete information as a decisive factor behind R&D investment is a relatively
less explored area in R&D literature. Some of the known works in this direction include
Brocas (2004), Grishagin, Sergeyev and Silipo (2001), Bacchiega and Garella (2008),
Conti (2013), Kabiraj and Chattopadhyay (2015) and Chattopadhyay and Kabiraj (2015).
Among these, Brocas (2004), Kabiraj and Chattopadhyay (2015) and Chattopadhyay
and Kabiraj (2015) discuss the role of incomplete information in choosing the R&D
organisation, that is, whether to perform R&D collaboratively or single-handedly. Conti
(2013) discusses the same issue in the presence of spillovers. Bacchiega and Garella (2008)
talk about a firm’s choice between witholding as opposed to disclosing R&D information.
Grishagin, Sergeyev and Silipo (2001), on the other hand, elaborate on a firm’s choice
regarding investment in R&D, but the setup deals more with imperfect information,
rather than incomplete information, since the paper discusses a context where firms
involve in a patent race, and do not know each other’s relative position in terms of R&D
- a frim decides to perform R&D only if it starts in the same position as its rival initially.
However, the main research question of this paper relates to the issue of rent dissipation
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in the context of patent race.
Then two recent papers by Chatterjee, Chattopadhyay and Kabiraj (2018, 2019) have
addressed directly the issue of how incomplete information may affect the R&D deci-
sion. Both these papers consider a Cournot duopoly where the firms decide whether to
invest in R&D prior to competition in the product market. The firms always perform
R&D non-cooperatively and there is no uncertainty in R&D outcomes. In Chatterjee,
Chattopadhyay and Kabiraj (2019) incomplete information arises due to unobservability
in the reduction of marginal cost of the rival. Moreover, a firm may or may not know
whether the rival has invested in R&D or not. There is, however, no spillover. Chatter-
jee, Chattopadhyay and Kabiraj (2018) have, on the other hand, analyzed the problem
where spillovers are present, but the extent to which a firm can benefit from spillover of
rival’s R&D outcomes is private information. Both these papers conclude that incomplete
information may enhance, under some parametric situations, the incentive to invest in
R&D activities compared to the case of complete information.
The present paper seeks to extend the above analysis of incomplete information to an-
other direction. Now, we consider that not only the R&D outcome is uncertain, hence
probabilistic, but the firms have incomplete information about the probability of the suc-
cess of the rival. Therefore, the probability of success in R&D is private information to
the concerned firm, that means, the probability of success of R&D for a particular firm
constitutes its type.
So, if pi ∈ [0, 1] be the probability of success of R&D, then pi has a probability distribution
function F (.) and density function f(.) with full support. Under incomplete information
the innovating firm knows pi, but the rival knows that pi is drawn from F (·). Firms
first simultaneously decide whether to do R&D or not, and if any firm does, it spends an
amountM > 0. We restrict to the scenario where innovation, if successful, is non-drastic,
therefore in the post-innovation situation all firms will operate at a positive output level.
Thus the purpose of the paper is to study how R&D incentives of firms get affected
when the probability of success is private information. This is not yet studied in R&D
literature.
One interesting result, we have derived in this paper, is non-monotonicity of R&D incen-
tive with respect to availability of information about the R&D characteristics of the rival
firm. We have rival’s type unknown. Then we compare it to the case where both the
rival’s R&D investment decision and status of R&D result are known (Level I incomplete
information); R&D incentive of a firm goes up as R&D status becomes unknown (Level
II Incomplete Information). Now if, in addition, R&D investment decision also becomes
incomplete information (Level III incomplete information), R&D incentive of a firm goes
down. This happens because of the signaling effect (to be discussed in an appropriate
3
place later in this paper) in case of Level II incomplete information as distinct from other
cases.
The organisation of the paper is as follows: section 2 specifies the model setup, section
3 describes the benchmark case of complete information framework, section 4 elaborates
on the three alternative incomplete information structures, viz. Level I, Level II and
Level III. Then section 5 compares the different information structures and derives the
important results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model Setup
Consider two firms, A and B. They compete in quantities in the product market. The
market price of the product is given by P = max{0, a−Q}, where a > 0 is the demand
parameter and Q is the aggregate output produced in the market. The marginal cost of
each firm is c. The firms can invest in a cost reducing R&D. The cost of research, M > 0,
is same for both the firms. If a firm invests in R&D and is successful, its marginal cost
will be (c − D); c > D > 0. The probability of success in R&D for firm i is pi ∈ [0, 1].
We assume that pi is private information and is distributed according to distribution
function F (·) and density function f(·) with full support. For technical reason we assume
a > c+ 3D.1
Consider the following notations: K := a − c, q(x) := K+x
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, Π(x) := q2(x) and Θ(x) :=∫ 1
x
y dF (y)
1−F (x)
.2 It is easy to check that q′ > 0, Π′ = 2
3
q(x) > 0, Θ′(x) > 0 when x ∈ (0, 1)
and limx→1 Θ(x) = 1.3
We further denote ‘doing research’ by R and ‘not doing research’ by N , ‘success’ by S
and ‘failure’ by F . When firm A chooses to invest in R&D and succeeds and firm B does
not invest in R&D, we denote profit (or expected profit) of firm A by Π[SN ]A (EΠ[SN ]A ) and
that of firm B by Π[SN ]B (EΠ[SN ]B ). Similar notations will be used for other cases.
We consider three pieces of information that will affect the decision to invest in R&D of
a firm:
1. Type of the rival, that is, whether rival’s type is known to the firm.
2. The decision of the rival to invest, that is, whether it is observable whether the
rival has invested or not.
1This states that the demand is suﬀiciently high.
2Θ(x) gives the average value of y given that y lies between x and 1.
3The intuition is that Θ(x) must lie between x and 1.
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3. The status of the rival’s research, that is, whether the rival has come up with a
success or failure in R&D when it has invested in R&D.
Our objective is to find out how the decision to perform R&D depends on the type of a
firm and the level of information available to it. We construct a two stage game. In the
first stage all firms decide simultaneously whether to invest in research or not, and in the
second stage they compete in the product market a la Cournot. To facilitate our analysis
we first provide the result for complete information model.
3 Complete Information: A Benchmark Case
We assume in this section that everything is common knowledge, including the types of
the firms. Since we are considering duopoly, at equilibrium several cases can happen: SS,
SF , SN , FS, FF , FN , NS, NF and NN .4 The lemma below summarizes the payoffs
of a firm under different equilibrium situations.
Lemma 1. The following holds for firm A
Π
[NN ]
A = Π
[NF ]
A = Π(0), Π
[FF ]
A = Π
[FN ]
A = Π(0)−M, Π
[SS]
A = Π(D)−M,
Π
[SN ]
A = Π
[SF ]
A = Π(2D)−M, Π
[FS]
A = Π(−D)−M, Π
[NS]
A = Π(−D).
Similarly for firm B.
Note that, when a firm is going to invest in R&D, it does not know whether it will succeed
or not.
When firm i does not invest in R&D but its rival does then its expected profit is
pjΠ(−D) + (1− pj)Π(0). When neither of them invests, its expected profit is Π(0).
Similarly, the expected profit of firm i when both firms invest is
pj [piΠ(D) + (1− pi)Π(−D)] + (1− pj) [piΠ(2D) + (1− pi)Π(0)]−M.
But if firm i alone invests, its expected profit is piΠ(2D) + (1− pi)Π(0)−M .
Therefore when the rival is not doing R&D, the expected “gain” from doing R&D of firm
i is pi [Π(2D)− Π(0)] −M and when the rival is doing research, the expected “gain” of
doing R&D for firm i is pi [pj (Π(D)− Π(−D)) + (1− pj) (Π(2D)− Π(0))]−M .
4SS denotes the situation that both firms are successful in R&D; SF (or FS) means one firm is
successful and the other firm has failed in R&D; SN (NS) implies that one firm has invested and
succeeded in R&D while the other firm has not invested in R&D; FN (or NF ) implies that one firm
has not invested in R&D and the other firm has invested and failed in R&D; FF indicates that both the
firms have invested in R&D but failed; and finally NN denotes the case where no firm invests in R&D.
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When a firm does not invest in R&D, its type is taken as zero. Define U (pi, pj) for all
i, j = {A,B} and i ̸= j, as
U (pi, pj) := pi [pjΠ(D) + (1− pj)Π(2D)] + (1− pi) [pjΠ(−D) + (1− pj)Π(0)]
So the firms have the following payoff matrix for doing and not doing R&D
Firm A
Firm B R NR
R U (pA, pB)−M , U (pB, pA)−M U (pA, 0)−M , U (0, pA)NR U (0, pB), U (pB, 0)−M U(0, 0), U(0, 0)
Table 1: Payoff matrix under complete information
If we define gross strategic incentive (GSI) as the difference in gross payoffs between
performing and not performing R&D when the rival firm is performing R&D, and gross
non-strategic incentive (GNSI) as the difference in gross payoffs between performing and
not performing R&D when the rival firm is not performing R&D, then
• GSI (pi, pj) := pi [pj [Π(D)− Π(−D)] + (1− pj) [Π(2D)− Π(0)]],
• GNSI (pi) := pi [Π(2D)− Π(0)].
Then we must have GNSI (pi) ≥ GSI (pi, pj), because Π(·) is strictly increasing and
strictly convex, hence, [Π(2D)− Π(0)] > [Π(D)− Π(−D)].
Now define
V (x) :=
M
x(Π(D)− Π(−D)) + (1− x)(Π(2D)− Π(0))
.
Then V ′(x) > 0.
Proposition 1. Under complete information,
(a) if pi < V (0), then firm i will never invest in research;
(b) if pi > V (pj), then firm i will always invest in research, and
(c) if V (pj) > pi > V (0), then firm i will invest in research provided firm j does not
invest in research.
The results underlying Proposition 1 are shown in Figure 1, which is similar to the one
we have used in an earlier paper (see Chatterjee, Chattopadhyay and Kabiraj (2019)).
Here V (pA) and V (pB) are increasing functions. Given the types of the firms, both the
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Figure 1: Research Possibilities under Complete Information
firms will invest in region 2, only firm A will invest in region 3(·), and only firm B will
invest in region 4(·). In contrast in region 5, either of the firms (but not both) will invest.
In the next section we develop the analysis under incomplete information. We consider
the following three situations:
(i) Level I incomplete information - here a firm knows the rival’s R&D and its R&D
status, but does not know the type of its rival.
(ii) Level II incomplete information - here a firm knows its rival’s R&D decision, but
does not know the type and the status of R&D of its rival.
(iii) Level III incomplete information - here the rival’s R&D decision, its R&D status
as well as its type are unknown to a firm.
4 Incomplete Information
In this section we discuss R&D incentives of firms under various levels of incomplete
information.
4.1 Level I Incomplete Information: Type unknown, decision and status
known
We assume incomplete information about the rival’s type. Thus a firm does not know
the probability of success of the rival if the rival is doing R&D. But the firm knows, just
before production takes place, whether the rival has invested in R&D or not, and whether
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the rival is successful or not if it has invested in R&D. However, at the time of investment
in R&D the firm does not know the type, decision and status (i.e. whether success or
failure) of its rival firm. Let τ1 be the threshold type of a firm such that if its type is
greater than this threshold, it will invest in R&D. So, our objective will be to find this
threshold value, given M .
Note that the final profit of a firm does not depend on the type of its rival after it observes
the decision and the status of R&D of its rival. So, the profit levels are exactly identical
to those in the complete information section. However, while deciding whether to invest
in R&D, no firm knows the decision of its rival and therefore does not know the status of
its rival’s R&D. A firm just knows that the probability that its rival will invest in R&D
is (1− F (τ1)), and if its rival invests in R&D then the expected probability of success is
Θ(τ1).
The expected profit of the firm when it does not invest in R&D is
F (τ1)Π(0) + (1− F (τ1)) [Θ(τ1)Π(−D) + (1−Θ(τ1))Π(0)] .
and the expected profit of the firm when it does invest in R&D is
pi [F (τ1)Π(2D) + (1− F (τ1)) [Θ(τ1)Π(D) + (1−Θ(τ1))Π(2D)]]
+ (1− pi) [F (τ1)Π(0) + (1− F (τ1)) [Θ(τ1)Π(−D) + (1−Θ(τ1))Π(0)]]−M.
Define T1(x; τ1) as gross opportunity “gain” of doing R&D, when the type of the firm is
x. Here
T1(x; τ1) := x [F (τ1)Π(2D) + (1− F (τ1)) [Θ(τ1)Π(D) + (1−Θ(τ1))Π(2D)]]
+ (1− x) [F (τ1)Π(0) + (1− F (τ1)) [Θ(τ1)Π(−D) + (1−Θ(τ1))Π(0)]]
− [F (τ1)Π(0) + (1− F (τ1)) [Θ(τ1)Π(−D) + (1−Θ(τ1))Π(0)]]
= x [[Π(2D)− Π(0)]− (1− F (τ1))Θ(τ1) [Π(2D)− Π(0)− Π(D) + Π(−D)]]
T1(x; τ1) is increasing in x. Also a firm whose type is τ1 must be indifferent between
investing and not investing in R&D. Therefore, the threshold value τ1 will be solved from
the equation T1(τ1; τ1) = M . We have the following result.
Proposition 2. Given any M > 0, suppose M < T1(1; 1). Then there exists a unique τ1
such that a firm will invest in research if and only if its type is greater than or equal to
τ1, when τ1 is solved from T1 (τ1; τ1) = M . If M > T1(1; 1), then no firm will invest in
research.
Proof. We have T1(0; 0) = 0. With slight abuse of notation, T1(1; 1) = limτ1→1 T1(τ1; τ1) =
Π(2D)− Π(0) > 0. Further, T1(x; x) is increasing in x ∈ (0, 1). To see this,
T1(x; x) = x {[Π(2D)− Π(0)]− (1− F (x))Θ(x) [Π(2D)− Π(0)− Π(D) + Π(−D)]}
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Hence,
T ′1(x; x) = {[Π(2D)− Π(0)]− (1− F (x))Θ(x) [Π(2D)− Π(0)− Π(D) + Π(−D)]}
+ x2f(x) [Π(2D)− Π(0)− Π(D) + Π(−D)] > 0
given Π(x) strictly increasing and convex in x so that Π(2D)− Π(0) > Π(D)− Π(−D).
Hence the result.
Given T1(x; x) is an increasing function, the critical τ1 will increase as M increases. This
is because as R&D becomes more costly, a firm requires a higher probability of success in
order to have incentive for investment in R&D. The following example shows the result.
Example 1. Let us assume: a = 10, c = 2,M = 2, D = 1 and pi is distributed uniformly
for all i ∈ {A,B}. Therefore, F (pi) = pi, K = 8 and Θ(pi) = pi+12 . Then τ1 must solve
the equation, τ1 [17 + τ 21 ] = 9. The above equation solves uniquely to τ1 = 0.5211. If
research cost is too high (i.e. more than 4), then no firm will do the research. On the other
hand, if there is no research cost, then both of them will invest in research, irrespective
of their types.
4.2 Level II Incomplete Information: Type unknown, investment decision
known but status unknown
In this section we assume that a firm does not know the type of its rival. Also, if its rival
has taken up R&D investment, the firm does not know whether the rival will succeed or
fail. However, the firm can observe whether the rival does R&D or not. Let τ2 be the
threshold value such that if the type of a firm is greater than or equal to τ2, then it will
invest in R&D. Our objective in this case is to find out such a τ2, given M .
The expected payoffs of the firms under level II incomplete information are given in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. The following results hold
(a) If none of the firms invests in R&D, the profit of firm i is Π[NN ]i = Π(0).
(b) If firm A does R&D but firm B does not, then the respective expected profits are
EΠ
[SN ]
A = Π
(
(3+Θ(τ2))D
2
), EΠ[FN ]A = Π
(
Θ(τ2)D
2
) and EΠ[RN ]B = Π(−Θ(τ2)D).
(c) If both of them are investing in R&D, then expected profits of firm A are given by
EΠ
[SR]
A = Π
(
(3−Θ(τ2))D
2
) and EΠ[FR]A = Π
(
−Θ(τ2)D
2
).
Similar expected profit expressions can be derived for firm B routinely.
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Derivation of the payoffs underlying Lemma 2(b) and 2(c) are given in Appendix 1.
From Lemma 2, the expected “gain” of investing in R&D for firm i when the rival is not
doing R&D is given by
piΠ
(
(3 + Θ(τ2))D
2
)
+ (1− pi)Π
(
Θ(τ2)D
2
)
− Π(0)−M.
Similarly, the expected “gain” of investing in R&D for firm i when the rival is doing
R&D, is given by
piΠ
(
(3−Θ(τ2))D
2
)
+ (1− pi)Π
(
−Θ(τ2)D
2
)
− Π(−Θ(τ2)D)−M.
Therefore the gross expected “gain” of doing research for the firm whose type is x, is
given by
T2(x; τ2) := F (τ2)
[
xΠ
(
(3 + Θ(τ2))D
2
)
+ (1− x)Π
(
Θ(τ2)D
2
)
− Π(0)
]
+ (1− F (τ2))
[
xΠ
(
(3−Θ(τ2))D
2
)
+ (1− x)Π
(
−Θ(τ2)D
2
)
− Π(−Θ(τ2)D)
]
T2(x; τ2) is increasing in x. Also a firm whose type is τ2 must be indifferent between
investing and not investing in R&D; therefore, τ2 will be solved from T2(τ2; τ2) = M . We
have
T2(x; x) =
[
xΠ
(
(3−Θ(x))D
2
)
+ (1− x)Π
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)
− Π(−Θ(x)D)
]
+F (x)x
[
Π
(
(3 + Θ(x))D
2
)
− Π
(
(3−Θ(x))D
2
)]
−F (x)x
[
Π
(
Θ(x)D
2
)
− Π
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)]
+F (x)
[
Π
(
Θ(x)D
2
)
− Π
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)
− Π(0) + Π(−Θ(x)D)
]
Hence, T2(0; 0) = Π
(
−Θ(0)D
2
)
− Π(−Θ(0)D) > 0, and with slight abuse of notation,
T2(1; 1) := limτ2→1 T2(τ2, τ2) = Π(2D)− Π(0).
Lemma 3. If K > 3D, then T2(x; x) is strictly increasing.
Proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix 2. We can now write the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given the functions T2 (x; τ2) and M , the following must hold:
(a) if M < T2(0; 0), then both the firms will invest in R&D,
(b) if M > T2(1; 1), then no firm will invest in R&D, and
(c) when T2 (0; 0) < M < T2 (1; 1), there exists a unique τ2 such that a firm will invest
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in R&D if and only if its type is greater than or equal to τ2 where τ2 is solved from
the equality T2 (τ2; τ2) = M ; then τ2 is increasing in M .
Since in the second stage firms know the R&D decision of their respective rivals, this
information can act as a signal. So, it is important now to check the incentive compati-
bility. We have claimed that a firm will invest in R&D if and only if the type of the firm
is greater than or equal to τ2. Suppose firm A follows this strategy and belief that firm
B also follows the same strategy. Further, firm B knows firms A’s strategy and belief.
Let
NRII(x; τ2) := F (τ2)Π(0) + (1− F (τ2))Π(−Θ(τ2)D)
be the expected profit of a firm when it does not invest in R&D. Similarly, let
RII(x; τ2) := x
[
F (τ2)Π
(
(3 + Θ(τ2))D
2
)]
+ (1− F (τ2))Π
(
(3−Θ(τ2))D
2
)
+(1− x)
[
F (τ2)Π
(
Θ(τ2)D
2
)
+ (1− F (τ2))Π
(
−
Θ(τ2)D
2
)]
be the gross expected profit of a firm which does invest in R&D. Note that RII(x; τ2) is
an increasing function of x. Also T2(x; τ2) = RII(x; τ2)−NRII(x; τ2). Then we can make
the following two observations.
First, suppose firm B’s type is less than τ2 but it decides to invest in R&D. Here, from
the second stage onwards, firm A believes that the type of firm B is greater than τ2. So,
firm A will produce accordingly. Note here the signaling aspect. Since the R&D status
of a firm can never be observed by its rival, but its R&D decision is fully observable,
the concerned firm has a scope for signaling its type the way it wishes, irrespective of
its true type. If it wants to make its rival believe that its type is greater than τ2, it will
conduct R&D, irrespective of its true type. It will do so if by inducing such a belief to the
rival, it experiences a higher expected profit compared to what it could earn by acting
according to its true type. The possibility of such signaling is unique in the case of Level
II incomplete information.
So the expected profit of firm B under R&D investment is RII(pB; τ2). However, if it had
not invested, then its expected profit would have been NRII(pB; τ2). Given the definition
of τ2, and that T2(x; τ2) is strictly increasing in x, the following must hold for all pB < τ2:
NRII(pB; τ2) > RII(pB; τ2)
So, if firm B’s type is less than τ2, then given firm A’s strategy and belief, it will never
invest in R&D.
Secondly, suppose firm B’s type is greater than τ2, but it decides not to invest in R&D.
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Here, from the second stage onward, firm A believes that the type of firm B is less than τ2.
So, firm A will produce accordingly. Then the expected profit of firm B is NRII(pB; τ2).
However, if it had invested, its expected profit would have been RII(pB; τ2). From the
definition of τ2, and since T2(x; τ2) is strictly increasing in x, we know that for all pB > τ2
the following holds:
RII(pB; τ2) > NRII(pB; τ2)
So, if firm B’s type is greater than τ2, then given firm A’s strategy and belief, it will
always invest in research.
By optimal strategy under level II incomplete information we mean that the firm will
invest in R&D if and only if its type is greater than or equal to τ2 and it believes that the
rival is following the same strategy. Thus, these two observations lead to the conclusion
that given that the rival is following the optimal strategy mentioned above, it is always
optimal for a firm to follow the same strategy. So, both the firms following this strategy
is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
The following example illustrates the result of Proposition 3.
Example 2. Assume that a = 10, c = 2, M = 2, D = 1 and pi is distributed uniformly
for all i ∈ {A,B}. Therefore, F (pi) = pi, K = 8 and Θ(pi) = pi+12 . Finally, τ2 is solved
from the following equation
28τ 32 + 17τ
2
2 + 470τ2 + 61
144
= 2
This solves τ2 uniquely to give τ2 = 0.4689. If the research cost is too high (i.e. more
than 4), then no firm will do any research. On the other hand, if the cost is too low (i.e.
less than 61/144), then both of them will invest in research.
4.3 Level III Incomplete Information: Type, decision and status unknown
In this subsection we assume that a firm does not know the type of its rival. Also, whether
the rival does or does not invest in R&D is unobservable. Therefore, whether the rival has
succeeded or failed in R&D is also unknown to the firm. As before, assume that a firm will
invest in R&D if its type is greater than or equal to τ3. Thus our objective in this section
is to find out such a τ3 givenM . Let H(x) := (1−F (x))Θ(x)D2 ; then H ′(x) = −12xf(x)D < 0.
The payoffs of a firm under various contingencies are given in Lemma 4 and are derived
in Appendix 3.
Lemma 4. The following results hold:
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(a) if firm i invests in R&D and succeeds, then its expected profit is
EΠ
[S]
i = Π
(
3D
2
−H(τ3)
)
−M,
(b) if firm i invests in R&D and fails, then its expected profit is
EΠ
[F ]
i = Π(−H(τ3))−M,
and
(c) if firm i does not invest in R&D, then its expected profit is EΠ[N ]i = Π(−H(τ3)).
Hence the gross expected “gain” from investing in R&D for firm i is
T3(x; τ3) := x
[
Π
(
3D
2
−H(τ3)
)
− Π(−H(τ3))
]
T3(x; τ3) is increasing in x. Define a firm of type τ3 which is indifferent between investing
and not investing in R&D. Then τ3 is solved from T3(τ3; τ3) = M . We have T3(0; 0) = 0,
and (with slight abuse of notation) T3(1; 1) := limτ3→1 T3(τ3, τ3) = Π(3D2 )−Π(0). Finally,
T3(x; x) is strictly increasing in (0, 1).5 Then we have the following results, as given in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The following results hold:
(a) If T3 (0; 0) < M < T3 (1; 1), there exists a unique τ3 such that a firm will invest in
research if and only if its type is greater than or equal to τ3 when τ3 can be obtained
by solving the equality T3 (τ3; τ3) = M .
(b) If M > T3(1; 1) then no firm will invest in R&D.
The following example illustrates the above results.
Example 3. Assume that a = 10, c = 2, M = 2, D = 1 and pi is distributed uniformly
for all i ∈ {A,B}. Therefore, F (pi) = pi, K = 8 and Θ(pi) = pi+12 . Then τ3 is solved
from the following equation
τ3(τ
2
3 + 34)
12
= 2
This solves uniquely τ3 = 0.696. If research cost is too high (i.e. more than 35/12), no
firm will perform research; on the other hand, if there is no R&D cost, then both of them
will invest in research, irrespective of their types.
5Because, T ′3(x;x) = [Π ( 3D2 −H(x))−Π(−H(x))] − [q ( 3D2 −H(x))− q (−H(x))] 23H ′(x). Boththe parts of the RHS are strictly positive.
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5 Comparison
In this section we compare the results under various information structures and examine
the role of information.
5.1 Complete vs Incomplete Information
In this subsection we show that there are situations when incomplete information may
enhance incentive for R&D investment compared to complete information case.
Proposition 5(A). There always exists M > 0 and types of firms A and B, viz. pA and
pB, such that both the firms will invest in R&D under Level II incomplete information,
but will never invest in R&D under complete information.
Proof. We know under complete information GNSI (0) = 0, and under Level II incom-
plete information T2(0; 0) > 0. Since both GNSI(·) and T (·; ·) are continuous, there
exists b ∈ (0, 1) such that for all x ∈ (0, b) we have T2(x; x) > GNSI(x). Then for all
M ∈ (0, GNSI(b)) and for all pA, pB ∈ (T−12 (M), GNSI−1(M)), both the firms will in-
vest in R&D under Level II incomplete information, but will never invest in R&D under
complete information.
Proposition 5(B). If both the firms are investing under Level I incomplete information,
then at least one firm will definitely invest under complete information.
Proof. Note that T1(0; 0) = GNSI(0) and T1(1; 1) = GNSI(1). But for all x ∈ (0, 1) we
have GNSI(x) > T1(x; x). Take any M ∈ (0, GNSI(1)), then τ2 > GNSI−1(M). Rest
of the proof is trivial.
Proposition 5(C). If both the firms invest under Level III incomplete information, then
they will definitely invest under complete information.
Proof. Note that
9
[
Π
(
3D
2
−H(x)
)
− Π(H(x))
]
=
[
2K +
3D
2
− 2H(x)
]
3D
2
Also
9 [Π(D)− Π(−D)] = 4KD >
[
2K +
3D
2
]
3D
2
> 9
[
Π
(
3D
2
−H(x)
)
− Π(H(x))
]
So for all x, y ∈ (0, 1), we have GSI(x, y) > GSI(x, 1) > T3(x; x). Rest of the proof is
trivial.
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We can explain the results underling Proposition 5(·). As we move from complete to
incomplete information, depending on the extents of uncertainty, there are three levels of
incomplete information, where maximum uncertainty arises under Level III incomplete
information. So under such a situation if for some (pa, pb) both firms do R&D then under
complete information they will certainly do. In case of Level I incomplete information,
uncertainty is lowest among these three cases of incomplete information. So for some
(pa, pb) when at least one firm does invest in R&D under complete information, under
Level I incomplete information both firms might do because one firm does not know
the other’s probability of succes with certainty. On the other hand, consideration of
R&D investment under Level II incomplete information takes care of the signaling effect
in the sense that if one firm invests in R&D, it may signal that its success is possibly
high. Therefore, in the situation when no firm does R&D under complete information,
both firms may invest because of the signaling effect. Thus our results show that there
are situations when incomplete information may lead to a higher incentives for R&D
investment compared to complete information.
5.2 Incomplete vs Incomplete Information
On comparing different cases of incomplete information we derive what we call non-
monotonicity of R&D incentive with respect to different levels of incomplete information.
In particular, we show that as less and less information becomes available, a firm’s R&D
incentive first increases, then it starts falling.
Let us first compare Level I and Level III incomplete information. It can be shown (see
Appendix 4) that:
T1(x; x) > T3(x; x) ∀x ∈ (0, 1)
Further, we have T1(0; 0) = T3(0; 0), but T1(1; 1) > T3(1; 1). Given that both T1 and T3
are increasing in x, this means we must have τ1 < τ3. This suggests that R&D incentive of
a firm under Level I incomplete information is larger than that under Level III incomplete
information. The reason is that compared to Level I incomplete information, there are
many characteristics of the rival unknown to the firm.
Now we compare Level I and Level II incomplete information. However, it may be recalled
that under Level II incomplete information, there is signaling effect through which a
firm may get larger information about its rival. Now given that T1(0; 0) < T2(0; 0),
T1(1; 1) = T2(1; 1), and both T1(·; ·) and T2(·; ·) are increasing functions of x, then if the
signaling effect is strong enough, T2(·; ·) will always be above T1(·; ·), ∀x ∈ (0, 1). This is
equivalent to restricting the F (·) function.
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Assume that F (·) satisfies the following condition for all x ∈ (0, 1):
(Θ(x)− x)
K
D
+Θ(x)[(2.5− F (x))x+ F (x)Θ(x)] > 1.75x+ 0.75Θ(x)2 (1)
If the above condition holds, we can say that the signaling effect is strong, and under this
condition we must have T2(x; x) > T1(x; x), ∀x ∈ (0, 1). The implication of this result is
that,
τ2 < τ1,
i.e. R&D incentive of a firm is larger under Level II incomplete information than that
under Level I incomplete information.
One may easily check that the condition (1) necessarily holds for uniform distribution
function (a linear distribution function) and many other distribution functions.6 There-
fore, combining the above analysis we can write the following result:
Proposition 6. Suppose the condition (1) holds. Then comparing all the threshold values
we must have τ2 < τ1 < τ3, that is, if the signaling effect is strong enough, R&D incentive
of a firm is larger under Level II incomplete information.
M,T1, T2, T3
0
x
M
T1
Π
(
−Θ(0)D2
)
−Π(−Θ(0)D)
T2
T3
Π(2D)−Π(0)
Π
(
3D
2
)
−Π(0)
1τ1τ2 τ3
Figure 2: Non-monotonicity result when (1) holds
Figure 2 portrays the result. This shows that R&D incentive of a firm is non-monotone
with respect to availability of information about rival’s characteristics. Hence under
incomplete information, as the level of information about the rival falls, R&D incentive
rises initially. However, if the level of information falls further, R&D incentive falls. We
illustrate the result with an example below.
Example 4. Let us assume a = 10, c = 2, M = 2, D = 1, and pi is distributed uniformly
for all i ∈ {A,B}. Our earlier examples show that in this case τ1 = 0.5211, τ2 = 0.4689
and τ3 = 0.696. So, here clearly we have, τ2 < τ1 < τ3.
6For example F (x) = x2 (a convex distribution function) and F (x) = 2x1+x (a concave distributionfunction) satisfy the above restriction.
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Note that the restriction we impose on the distribution function is a suﬀicient condition
for getting the non-monotone relationship; the condition is not necessary. So when the
condition does not hold, suppose T2 intersects T1 at an intermediate probability, say τc.7
Then given both T2 and T1 strictly increasing and 0 = T1(0) < T2(0) < T2 (τc) = T1 (τc),
there existsM ∈ (0, T2 (τc)) for which the desired non-monotonic relationship holds. This
possibility is shown in Figure 3.
A firm has scope for signaling its type that may be different from its true type if it wants
its rival firm to believe its signaled type under Level II incomplete information structure.
This is, however, not possible under complete or other incomplete information structures.
That is why a firm might invest in R&D even though it has a low type, just to convince
its rival that it has a higher type under Level II incomplete information. This accounts
for the observed non-monotonicity in the above result.
M,T1, T2, T3
0
x
M
T1
T2
T3
Π(2D)−Π(0)
1τ1τ2 τ3
T2 (τc)
τc
Figure 3: Non-monotonicity result when (*) does not hold
6 Conclusion
In the present paper we have discussed R&D incentives of a firm in a duopoly under
various (incomplete) information structures hitherto not properly dealt with in the liter-
ature. First, that R&D outcome is uncertain is fully recognized in the literature - that is
no guarantee that R&D investment will always yield a success. But more importantly,
the probability of success in R&D depends to a large extend, on factors endogenous to a
firm. Therefore, probability of success itself can be uncertain. It may be more known to
the firm undertaking the R&D investment than to its rivals. Hence in the present paper
we have assumed that a firm’s probability of success in R&D is private information. This
constitutes its type. Second, when a firm takes its decision regarding R&D investment,
7If there are multiple intersections then τc is the probability level for which we have the first inter-section (i.e. pt is minimum of all those probabilities for which we have intersections).
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it may or may not know whether its rival is going to invest in R&D. Third, at time of
production decision, even if a firm knows whether its rival has invested in R&D, still the
firm under consideration is uncertain about the rival’s R&D outcome, that is, even when
it is known that the rival has invested in R&D, the firm may or may not know whether
the rival has a success or failure.
Given this kind of uncertainty, we have considered the following three information struc-
tures depending on the levels of uncertainty or incomplete information. Under Level I
incomplete information, only rival’s type is unknown, but the firm knows with certainty
about the R&D investment decision and status of R&D outcome of the rival. Under
Level II incomplete information, rival’s type is unknown, investment decision is known,
but the status of R&D is unknown. Finally, Level III incomplete information assumes
that the rival’s type, investment decision, as well as status of R&D, are all unknown to
a firm.
In the paper we have first shown that given the level of information, there are situations
when incomplete information enhances R&D incentive of a firm compared to complete
information situation. This may happen because a firm under incomplete information
structure may underestimate the R&D capability of its rival. Then we have derived an
interesting result. We find that R&D incentive to invest in R&D is highest in the case
of Level II incomplete information, but lowest under Level III incomplete information.
Therefore, there is a monotone relation between the R&D incentive and the level of
incomplete information. As information incompleteness goes up initially from Level I to
Level II, R&D incentive goes up, but as further uncertainty about the rival’s attributes
increases, the firm’s R&D incentive falls. R&D incentive under Level II is highest because
of the presence of signaling effect in this case. Although a firm’s type is unknown, but by
means of its investment decision it can give a signal to its rival that it is of high type firm,
irrespective of its true type. So the rival may believe that the firm’s type is high, above
the threshold value. Hence in the presence of signaling effect a firm’s incentive for R&D
is higher. But as further information available to a firm declines, the firm is discouraged
to invest under increasing uncertainty.
Finally to mention, we have proved our results under a broad class of probability distri-
bution functions of types. We have provided examples supporting our results.
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Appendices
Appendix 1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. (a) This is obvious.
(b) The expected profit function of firm A is
pA
[(
(K +D)− q
[SN ]
A − q
[RN ]
B
)
q
[SN ]
A
]
+ (1− pA)
[(
K − q
[FN ]
A − q
[RN ]
B
)
q
[FN ]
A
]
−M.
Similarly the expected profit of firm B is(
K − q
[RN ]
B −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[SN ]
A + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[FN ]
A
])
q
[RN ]
B .
We have three reaction functions as given below
K +D = 2q
[SN ]
A + q
[RN ]
B , K = 2q
[FN ]
A + q
[RN ]
B ,
and
K = 2q
[RN ]
B +
[
Θ(τ2)q
[SN ]
A + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[FN ]
A
]
.
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We also have three unknowns viz, q[SN ]A , q[FN ]A and q[RN ]B . Therefore by solving we
get
q
[SN ]
A = q
(
(3 + Θ(τ2))D
2
)
, q
[FN ]
A = q
(
Θ(τ2)D
2
)
and q[RN ]B = q (−Θ(τ2)D) .
Hence the payoffs.
(c) The expected profit of firm A is given by
pA
[
(K +D)− q
[SR]
A −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[RS]
B + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[RF ]
B
]]
q
[SR]
A
+(1− pA)
[
K − q
[FR]
A −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[RS]
B + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[RF ]
B
]]
q
[FR]
A −M.
So, firm A has two reaction functions
K +D = 2q
[SR]
A −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[RS]
B + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[RF ]
B
]
,
and
K = 2q
[FR]
A −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[RS]
B + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[RF ]
B
]
.
The expected profit of firm B is given by
pB
[
(K +D)− q
[RS]
B −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[SR]
A + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[FR]
A
]]
q
[RS]
B
+(1− pB)
[
K − q
[RF ]
B −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[SR]
A + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[FR]
B
]]
q
[RF ]
B −M.
So, firm B has two reaction functions
K +D = 2q
[RS]
B −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[SR]
A + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[FR]
A
]
,
and
K = 2q
[RF ]
B −
[
Θ(τ2)q
[SR]
A + (1−Θ(τ2))q
[FR]
A
]
.
So we have four reaction functions with four unknowns. By solving them we get
for firm A
q
[SR]
A = q
[RS]
B = q
(
(3−Θ(τ2))D
2
)
and q[FR]A = q[RF ]B = q
(
−Θ(τ2)D
2
)
.
Appendix 2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. To prove Lemma 3, first consider the expression of T2(x; x). From the expression
in the first brackets in T2(x; x),
d
dx
[
xΠ
(
(3−Θ(x))D
2
)
+ (1− x)Π
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)
− Π(−Θ(x)D)
]
=
[
Π
(
(3−Θ(x))D
2
)
− Π
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)]
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+
2
3
[
2q(−Θ(x)D)− xq
(
(3−Θ(x))D
2
)
− (1− x)q
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)]
Θ′(x)D
2
.
The first part of the RHS is clearly positive. For the second part, note that if K > 3D
then 2q(−Θ(x)D) > q ( (3−Θ(x))D
2
)
> q
(
−Θ(x)D
2
) holds.
Similarly for the combined expression within the second and third brackets in T2(x; x),
d
dx
[
Π
(
(3 + Θ(x))D
2
)
− Π
(
(3−Θ(x))D
2
)
− Π
(
Θ(x)D
2
)
+Π
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)]
=
2
3
[
q
(
(3 + Θ(x))D
2
)
+ q
(
(3−Θ(x))D
2
)
− q
(
Θ(x)D
2
)
−
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)]
Θ′(x)D
2
> 0.
And that within the fourth brackets in T2(x; x)
d
dx
[
Π
(
Θ(x)D
2
)
− Π
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)
− Π(0) + Π(−Θ(x)D)
]
=
2
3
[
q
(
Θ(x)D
2
)
+ q
(
−Θ(x)D
2
)
− 2q(−Θ(x)D)
]
Θ′(x)D
2
> 0
Therefore all the three parts of the RHS of the T2(x; x) is strictly increasing. So, T2(x; x)
is strictly increasing.
Appendix 3 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Note that the expected profit of firm A if she invests in research and succeed is
(1− F (τ3))
[
(K +D)− q
[S]
A −
[
Θ(τ3)q
[S]
B + (1−Θ(τ3))q
[F ]
B
]]
q
[S]
A
+F (τ3)
[
(K +D)− q
[S]
A − q
[N ]
B
]
q
[S]
A −M.
Similarly, the expected profit of firm A if she invests in research and failed is
(1− F (τ3))
[
K − q
[F ]
A −
[
Θ(τ3)q
[S]
B + (1−Θ(τ3))q
[F ]
B
]]
q
[F ]
A
+F (τ3)
[
K − q
[F ]
A − q
[N ]
B
]
q
[F ]
A −M.
Finally, the expected profit of firm A, if she does not invest in research, is
(1− F (τ3))
[
K − q
[N ]
A −
[
Θ(τ3)q
[S]
B + (1−Θ(τ3))q
[F ]
B
]]
q
[N ]
A
+F (τ3)
[
K − q
[N ]
A − q
[N ]
B
]
q
[N ]
A .
Looking at these expected profit functions it is clear that at equilibrium we have q[F ]A =
q
[N ]
A ; called it q[N ]A .
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So for firm A we have two reaction functions given below
K +D = 2q
[S]
A +
[
q
[N ]
B + (1− F (τ3))Θ(τ3)
(
q
[S]
B − q
[N ]
B
)]
,
and
K = 2q
[N ]
A +
[
q
[N ]
B + (1− F (τ3))Θ(τ3)
(
q
[S]
B − q
[N ]
B
)]
.
Similarly for firm B we have two reaction functions given below
K +D = 2q
[S]
B +
[
q
[N ]
A + (1− F (τ3))Θ(τ3)
(
q
[S]
A − q
[N ]
A
)]
,
and
K = 2q
[N ]
B +
[
q
[N ]
A + (1− F (τ3))Θ(τ3)
(
q
[S]
A − q
[N ]
A
)]
.
So we have four reaction functions and four unknowns, viz. q[S]A , q[N ]A , q[S]B and q[N ]B . Solving
them we get for firm A
q
[S]
A = q
[S]
B = q
(
3D
2
−H(τ2)
)
and q[N ]A = q[N ]B = q (−H(τ3)) .
The rest of the proof is trivial.
Appendix 4 Comparing Threshold Values Under Level I and Level III In-
complete Information
Proof. Note that Π(2D) − Π(0) > Π(D) − Π(−D) > Π (3D
2
−H(x)
)
− Π(−H(x)) for
all x ∈ (0, 1) , as K > 3D and the Π(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex to the
origin. Let G(x) := Π (3D
2
−H(x)
)
− Π(−H(x)).
Therefore,
F (x) [Π(2D)− Π(0)] + (1− F (x)) [Θ(x) (Π(D)− Π(−D)) + (1−Θ(x)) (Π(2D)− Π(0))]
> F (x)G(x) + (1− F (x)) [Θ(x)G(x) + (1−Θ(x))G(x)] = G(x).
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